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Abstract: I will contend that Fuller's secular or "procedural" natural law, as described by Moffat, does not cover 
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viable today, and that there are some key elements in Fuller's theory that actually conflict with substantive natural 
law and might therefore be criticized from that perspective. 
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 [pg202]** Since Lon Fuller was the efficient, sufficient, and necessary cause of my 
entering the field of jurisprudence, it is with some trepidation that I venture here to criticize his 
work. However, I take a little comfort from the fact that he always welcomed criticism, even 
from, and sometimes particularly from, the converted. 
 
 I will contend that Fuller's secular or "procedural" natural law, as described by Professor 
Moffat, does not cover the theoretical position that could be occupied by a substantive natural 
lawyer, that such a theoretical position is viable today, and that there are some key elements in 
Fuller's theory that actually conflict with substantive natural law and might therefore be 
criticized from that perspective. The following chart indicates that my criticism will come from 
the "right wing." For the most part, Fuller's critics have come from the left, and I remember the 
rather bemused-amused look on his face when he talked about how hospitable various Catholic 
theologians and Jesuits were to his writings—the point was that maybe their hospitality grew 
out of some misconceptions about what he was actually saying. (Interestingly enough, though it 
is a point I will not pursue here, I have an impression that in the past decade leading Catholic 
thought has moved leftward towards Fuller's actual position!) 
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 [pg203] Fuller always maintained that the calling-card of a positivist was an insistence 
that law has no necessary connection with morality,FN1 and the above chart reflects my 
agreement with this observation. Bentham argued that the tendency to confuse morality and law 
was what made the common law so reactionary and blind to social progress.FN2 Hart is only 
slightly less critical; he allows that morality does accompany law over time as a historical, but 
not as a necessary, obliggato.FN3 Dworkin does not really attack positivism on this central 
issue, and hence I place him still to the left of center.FN4 Dworkin seems to attribute moral 
dimensions to the notions of freedom and of equal respect for persons, from which standpoint 
he criticizes various legal issues, but it is not clear to me whether he considers his critique as 
valid generally or only as a specific interpretation of the U.S. Constitution.FN5 In contrast, 
Fuller includes any and all legal systems in his observation that order, coherence, and clarity 
have an affinity with morality.FN6 Fuller is not clear whether he means that this affinity is a 
matter of historical observation (and thus somewhat like Hart's concept) or a matter of 
necessity; I think he probably meant it was both. But even so, he is talking about the "internal 
morality of law" and on that point he differs from the right wing. Cicero regarded morality and 
law necessarily connected as to specific substantive obligations.FN7 True laws, according to 
Cicero, were those laws consistent with justice and natural law; if a law duly enacted was 
inconsistent with justice or morality, then it was a law in name only, not deserving of the title 
“law” any more than a harmful chemical packaged a non-druggist was entitled to be called a 
"prescription."FN8 Nor is this a mere verbal dispute, since citizens and judges only have an 
obligation to obey true laws; they have no obligation to obey the other kind which are only 
commands that might equally issue from a gang of thieves as from the government.  
 
 The position that Fuller staked out for himself on the jurisprudential spectrum was at 
least politically astute. To his right were [pg204] Catholics and antiquarians steeped in 
normative universalist theories. Fuller could play it as close to the center as possible and still 
have the entire right-half of the chart for himself. Moreover, in this century, positivism in legal 
philosophy like positivism in philosophy and in the sciences has seemed to be scientific, 
rational, empirical, and precise. Fuller did battle with critics on his left by using the same value-
free terms as they, by appearing neutral and unbiased even as he brilliantly unmasked the deep 
antirationalism of Austin and Kelsen.FN9 Moreover, had he moved to the right, he probably 
would have been associated with Roman Catholicism, Crusades, Inquisitions, and infallible 
popes—not the best company for a legal theorist in the mid-twentieth century. More 
fundamentally, I believe Fuller was somewhat a prisoner of the age of relativism. The public 
believed that Einstein showed that everything was relative (nothing could be farther from the 
truth; Einstein constructed his entire theory upon a universal absolute, the speed of light).FN10 
Anthropologists in the early and mid-twentieth century were instructing generations of college 
students and through them the public as a whole that morality is relative, varying from culture 
to culture, and we must be tolerant of people whose values are very different from our 
own.FN11 And in legal theory the search has been for neutral principles to which no one could 
take offense.FN12 The pseudo-scientific rationalism of the positivists combined with the 
cynicism of the legal realists to instruct generations of law students not only that there are two 
sides to every issue but that both sides are equally arguable, reasonable, and (as far as anyone 




 In contrast, the substantive natural law position holds that some things are right for all 
times and all places, other things are always wrong, and two reasonable people could not differ 
about which was which because if they differed then one of them would not be reasonable. 
Because this position seems unscientific, and because it not only seems but is universalistic, 
absolutistic, and arrogant, the burden is on me to explain why it is a defensible position and 
ought to be taken seriously. I will try to do this by way of linguistic analysis and some 
comments about cultural anthropology.  
 
 [pg205] Let me start with two stipulated definitions. I will define morality-one (M-l) as 
that morality which you, the reader and observer for the purpose of this discussion, consider 
universally valid. For example, I believe you would condemn at any time and any place the 
deliberate infliction of severe pain upon an innocent child or the deliberate killing of a person 
for the killer's own personal profit. Let me define morality-two (M-2) as relative morality, that 
is, something which you might label as immoral in some societies and places and moral in 
others. For example, I would guess that you might consider extramarital sexual intercourse  
among consenting adults as not contrary to the morality of the city you are living in today, but 
you might consider it contrary to the morality of that city a hundred years ago. And even if I am 
not right in these guesses, I think I can safely predict that you would not consider extramarital 
sexual intercourse to be immoral among the Pueblos of New Mexico as reported by 
anthropologist Ruth BenedictFN13 or the teenagers of Samoa as reported by Margaret 
Mead.FN14 
 
 Now let us look more closely at M-2. If you the observer can say of practice X that it is 
moral in society A but immoral in society B, do you conclude for yourself that the morality of 
X is relative to the society in which it occurs? We have many examples of customs and mores 
that are relative to their societies: it is a breach of etiquette to eat with one's fingers in this 
country and a breach of etiquette not to do so in some other countries; fifty years ago a 
gentleman was expected to open a door for a lady, today some women consider such action to 
be a sign of male chauvinism. I think it's safe to conclude. that you do not consider any of these 
variable customs or mores to be, for you, matters of "morality." But now what about 
extramarital sexual intercourse? If you believe that it is moral in some places and times and 
immoral in others, then for you it is a matter of M-2. But now I want to make a stronger 
conclusion. I would argue that any example you come up with of M-2 is not for you a matter of 
morality at all. I do not believe that if you can truly countenance behavior X as right for some 
societies and places, while holding it to be wrong for other societies or places, that you are 
talking about "morality" at all. At best, you are describing what other people may call act X. In 
short, M-2 is "custom" or "mores" and not "morality." 
 
 If now we turn to M-l and any list of examples of it you might care to make, such as 
murder or child abuse, I believe you would condemn it wherever or whenever it occurs.FN15 
You would indeed feel an inner [pg206] compulsion to intervene to prevent a child from being 
tortured, for instance, or you might call third persons or the police or speak up and at least try to 
convince the actor to cease and desist. These same internal feelings of an urge to intervene or to 
condemn cannot rationally be present if the time or the place of the act makes all the difference 
to you—that is, if your attitude is "when in Rome, do as the Romans do." An analogy might be 
the way we treat one case as precedent for another. If we say that a previous case is “on all 
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fours" with a current case, we omit differences such as the fact that the previous case took place 
at an earlier time, or that there were different parties to that case, or that, although it occurred in 
the same legal jurisdiction as the current case, the facts of that case occurred three miles away 
from the facts of the present case. A true precedent is like a moral judgment. Although we 
might call extramarital sexual intercourse a matter of "morality," and although I provisionally 
labelled it M-2 to reflect this popular nomenclature, in fact practices that we tolerate as relative 
to a particular society are not for us moral practices at all. The point is put this way by 
Professor William Frankena: 
 
Suppose I go to Jones for advice about what to do in situation Y, and he tells me that I morally ought to 
do Z. Suppose I also recall that the day before he had maintained that W was the right thing for Smith to 
do in a situation of the same kind. I shall then certainly point this out to Jones and ask him if he is not 
being inconsistent. Now suppose that Jones does not do anything to show that the two cases are different, 
but simply says, "No, there is no connection between the two cases. Sure, they are alike, but one was 
yesterday and involved Smith. Now it’s today and you are involved." Surely, this would strike us as an 
odd response from anyone who purports to be taking the moral point of view or giving moral advice. The 
fact is that when one makes a moral judgment in a particular situation, one implicitly commits oneself to 
making the same judgment in any similar situation, even if the second situation occurs at a different time 
or place, or involves another agent.FN16  
 
 [pg207] But why then do we hear so much about moral relativism if the  conclusion I 
have reached is valid, namely, that the term "moral" in "moral relativism" is an incorrect and 
misleading use of that term? I  believe that the answer is that the famous cultural 
anthropologists of  the early and mid-twentieth century, such as William Graham Sumner, 
Raymond Firth, Ruth Benedict, Kroeber and Kluckhohn, and  Margaret Mead, through their 
studies of remote, primitive, or isolated  cultures, were surprisingly successful in teaching 
college students and  the general public that morality is relative to a particular culture and  
hence we should be tolerant of other values. Ruth Benedict writes, for example, "We recognize 
that morality differs in every society, and is a convenient term for socially approved 
habits."FN17 And in a different  book, she calls upon us to get rid of our cultural 
ethnocentrism, and to  tolerate not only the behavior of people in other societies but also the  
abnormal behavior of persons in our own society.FN18 "Moral" relativism thus becomes a plea 
for tolerance, a plea that in our time falls upon receptive ears.  
 
 The trouble with the anthropologists' theories is that they all generalize from a single 
example: extramarital sexual intercourse. This is the practice they find in other societies that 
they label as immoral in our view but moral for those societies, and then conclude that we 
should be tolerant of behavior we consider immoral because the people who engage in that 
behavior probably consider it moral. But as the philosopher John Cook has found after studying 
the anthropologists' writings, there are no other examples that they adduce of this moral 
relativism.FN19 To be sure they find folkways, mores, and customs different in different 
societies, but we do not label any of those behaviors "immoral." And when they find things that 
we consider immoral, it turns out on considered examination that all the other societies consider 
them as immoral also. To be sure, we sometimes have to look below the surface. A primitive 
society that engages in human sacrifice to appease the rain god might superficially be thought 
of as condoning murder. But if we examine what those people believe—that this is the only way 
to bring rain, and that rain is necessary to avert mass starvation from crop failure, then the 
sacrifice, no matter how absurd or superstitious it looks to us, is not murder. A parallel might be 
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if aliens from another galaxy land on [pg208] Earth and accuse all of us of murder because our 
society condones capital punishment. We sometimes hear opponents of capital punishment say 
that "we are all murderers," and this is an attention-getting use of the term, but I don't think 
anyone seriously means that every adult in the United States should be locked in prison for the 
rest of his or her life because of this accusation. What we would say to the visitors from another 
galaxy is that we condone capital punishment out of the belief that murder will be deterred and 
thus fewer people will die than if we did not execute murderers. To the aliens, this may not 
sound any more scientific than human sacrifice to bring rain, but it does not mean that the 
society as a whole has committed "murder" in the moral sense that each member of the society 
should be severely punished therefor. 
 
 Perhaps the reason the anthropologists were able to get away with such a huge 
generalization based on the single case of extramarital sexual intercourse practices among the 
cultures they examined is that American society in the early and mid-twentieth century largely 
believed that such practices were immoral. The anthropologists, in fact, were a potent factor in 
convincing the public that extramarital sexual intercourse is not immoral. They might have 
done this simply by saying, in effect, see, other societies do these things all the time and 
nobody gets hurt and people seem to get along very well and therefore you should re-examine 
the Puritanical standards in the United States. But that was not the academic way of theorizing. 
So instead they argued that all morality is relative to particular societies, and that sexual 
immorality is a very interesting example of this general thesis. Their conclusion got across to 
college students—namely, that extra-marital sex should not be taboo. But their reasoning has 
plagued us since with M-2 which, as I have argued, is not really "morality" at all. 
 
 Substantive natural law is founded upon a universal morality, or M-1. It is not a matter 
of over-theorizing or verbal imprecision. The substantive natural law position says that human 
beings living in society have certain innate rights and obligations. Among the things prohibited 
are murder, torture, theft, cheating, or the violation of any laws that are tied into, and a part of, a 
regime of justice. There is no tolerance for people who act on different opinions about these 
standards; far from expressing tolerance, the natural law advocate will insist that if persons act 
upon their different standards—for instance, commit murder—they should be punished for their 
acts. This is not a neutral or value-free philosophy, and it may very well be viewed as arrogant 
or old fashioned. Additionally, it is a philosophy that views itself as prior to the legal system 
and a restraint upon that legal system. In that sense it is quite undemocratic, in that it recognizes 
that [pg209] legislative majorities may pass laws that contradict the natural law.FN20 Under 
Cicero's view, "these no more deserve to be called laws than the rules a band of robbers might 
pass in their assembly."FN21 Hence, in his view, people should not obey them (and if people 
do, it is only because they are being coerced—Hart's "gunman" situation).FN22 Finally, natural 
law would enforce some rules as part of the legal system even if no statutes were ever passed 
making them laws. Cicero's example is the rape of Lucretia. The rape was illegal, he writes, 
"even if there was no written law against rape in Rome" at that time.FN23  
 
 Fuller's philosophy sharply departs from natural law on such matters. In his basic 
formulation of the "internal morality of law," Fuller writes that "certainly there can be no 
rational grounds for asserting that a man can have a moral obligation to obey a legal rule that 
does not exist, or is kept secret from him, or that came into existence only after he had acted.... 
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FN24 But Cicero's rape example contravenes Fuller directly. Or what if a legislature fails to 
renew a criminal code after its expiration date as set by a previous legislature? Then many 
[pg210] criminal rules would “not exist," in Fuller's terms, but they would continue to exist 
under a natural law view of the legal system. And how would Fuller deal with common law 
crimes? To be sure, Fuller's description of common law is one of the best contributions he has 
made,FN25 and yet the very first case involving a new crime that nevertheless violates natural 
law would pose a difficult problem for Fuller in light of his strictures on the "internal morality 
of law." So too would the Nuremberg trials.FN26 There, the Nazi defendants pleaded that there 
was no law and hence they should not be punished, and though international lawyers can and 
have shown that international rules proscribing the defendants' actions did exist, one can hardly 
say of those rules that they fitted Fuller's eight conceptions of what constitute the internal 
morality of law. Finally, Fuller's very use of the term "morality" in his concept of the "internal 
morality of law" tends to throw us off, because he seems to be pitting one kind of morality 
(procedural) against another (substantive).FN27 We begin to suspect that Fuller has used the 
term "morality" the way I have defined M-2, as an honorific title and not really a matter of 
morality at all. 
 
 I would like to develop my contention of moral relativism in Fuller's work by reference 
to a different, though also central, thesis of his. I will use an extended example given by Fuller 
in his essay “Reason and Fiat in Case Law,"FN28 which he regarded as one of the two most 
succinct statements of his philosophy.FN29 In that essay he asks us to imagine a group of 
shipwrecked men on an isolated island. We also imagine that each man has been visited by an 
amnesia that has wiped out all memories of previous social existence and laws and 
conventions—an idea rather like Rawls' "original position" in A Theory of Justice FN30 which 
came out twenty-five years after Fuller's essay. Disputes arise and the group selects one of their 
number to be a judge or arbitrator for all controversies. The question is, what standards does he 
use when there are no rules or laws on the books and no one remembers anything of life before 
landing on the island?  
 
 [pg211] Fuller replies that such a judge or arbitrator will make his decisions conform to 
the group's purpose and goals. He will know that his decisions will come to be looked on as 
precedents, and hence can foresee that there would emerge from his decisions a body of rules 
that will both conform to the needs of the group and help shape the group's behavior. In short, 
he will believe, and will be justified in believing, "that there are external criteria, found in the 
conditions required for successful group living, that furnish some standard against which the 
rightness of his decisions should be measured."FN31 These standards, Fuller says, reflect 
"natural law," although Fuller adds that the term "still has about it a rich, deep odor of the 
witches' caldron, and the mere mention of it suffices to unloose a torrent of emotions and 
fears."FN32  
 
 But, we may ask, are these "external criteria found in the conditions required for 
successful group living" really "natural law"? Suppose one day the judge or arbitrator is 
informed that two of the men in the community of, say, thirty-three, were discovered by 
separate eyewitnesses as engaging in homosexual practices. The judge says, "What of it?" and 
the informers reply that naturally the two men must be executed swiftly and silently, lest their 
behavior "spread" and "infect and ultimately destroy" the rest of the community. The judge, 
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shocked to hear this, duly sets about conversing, one at a time, with every member of the group 
except the two accused persons, and finds that all thirty of the men he talks with share the deep 
and passionate conviction that homosexuals should be immediately executed.FN33 What 
should the judge decide when faced with uncontrovertible evidence of homosexual practice and 
with unanimity among the rest of the group that the behavior should be met with summary 
execution? There is nothing in Fuller's account of law making in this community, even though 
he labels it "natural law," that I can see the judge could [pg212] evoke to avoid such an extreme 
penalty. The members of the group want the homosexuals to be executed, they desire it for the 
preservation of the group and its values as they understand those values, and they are perfectly 
ready to accept that decision as a precedent for any future cases of homosexuality. Moreover, 
even if we include into the equation all of Fuller's strictures in his later book The Morality of 
LawFN34 about the "inner morality of law," having to do with clarity, generality, conformity of 
rule to administrative action, avoidance of inconsistency or impossibility, and so forth, we still 
find no way for the judge to say that he cannot condone such a harsh penalty for an act of free 
choice on the part of two men in the group. Not only do I find nothing in Fuller's philosophy to 
prevent the judge from conforming his decision to the purposes and goals of the group, which 
in this case means to order the execution of the two homosexuals, but also Fuller's philosophy 
seems to require it. And more importantly, it would be particularly difficult for the judge in my 
hypothetical to try to invoke a different philosophy—that of natural law—even if he wanted to 
combat Fuller's. That particular difficulty arises from [pg213] Fuller's own invocation of the 
terms "natural” and "morality" to support and give extra weight to his philosophy, leaving our 
poor judge—assuming he does not want to execute the homosexuals—to say feebly, "but I don't 
mean that kind of 'natural law' or that kind of 'morality,''' The members of his group might be 
rather impatient with what to them might appear the judge's verbal quibbling with the eminent 
philosopher Lon Fuller. It's much easier for them and for the reader to think that Fuller was 
using the term "morality" in the standard way, just as many readers of Ruth Benedict found it 
much easier, and more interesting, to accept without much thought her invocation of the same 
term. For to think of Fuller and Benedict as simply meaning M-2 is almost to rob their writing 
of its force and power—even though such a step would promote clarity. 
 
 I find throughout Fuller's philosophy the recurrent notion that if we sufficiently take into 
account a society's purposes, aspirations, common needs, and goals, we can achieve a complete 
account, understanding, and specification of its laws. The proper construction of any statute, 
according to Fuller, rests upon an appreciation of these shared purposes. The important element 
that I find missing from Fuller's philosophy is that sometimes shared purposes are not enough if 
the group itself is committing an immoral act. The act, to my mind, does not have to be as 
blatant as executing homosexuals; equally invalid would be Justice Chase's example of a 
legislature taking A's property away and giving it to B.FN35 Or more recently, Nazi 
persecution of minorities would illustrate the point. It does not matter to me that the greatest 
good of the greatest number might be served by any of these three examples.FN36 But I suspect 
that utilitarianism, which certainly can be contrary to the rights of individuals as well as to 
substantive natural law in general,FN37 tends to color Fuller's philosophy just as deeply as it 
more explicitly colors the philosophies of the positivists whom Fuller attacked. Utilitarianism is 
a comfortable bedfellow with moral relativism, for both are not rooted in any particular 
normative vision of human nature but are rather free-floating systems whose content can totally 




 [pg214] But even if there is relativity in Fuller's vision of common purpose in a given 
society, that fact should not obscure the significance of Fuller's quest for normative standards 
for the interpretation of law. He understood, as many contemporary writers do not, that "natural 
law" is by no means a mere circumlocution for procedural or substantive morality, but rather 
indicates a process of legal interpretation that fuses the normative with the descriptive or 
empirical analysis of law. To invoke the idea of "natural law" is to be saying something about 
existing law, and not about some other normative system divorced from law or in parallel to the 
legal system.FN39 It is thus somewhat disappointing to see in Robert Cover's important book 
Justice AccusedFN40 an easy equation of "natural law" with a substantive moral position (that 
slavery is immoral),FN41 followed by his derogatory references to the "natural law 
idiom"FN42 and his uneasy conclusion that positivism won't work and something else is 
needed (but by then he cannot advocate “natural law").FN43 
 
 Professor Cover missed an opportunity in his book to apply natural law precisely to the 
problem that he dealt with extensively—Northern judges faced with the issue of returning 
fugitive slaves back to their "owners" in the South. This issue arose in many contexts, notably 
the legal obligation of a magistrate or judge to send back a fugitive slaveFN44 and the question 
of civil damages for harboring a fugitive slave under the Act of Congress of 1793.FN45 In my 
opinion, a natural law analysis would say that whatever the legal relation might be between 
slave and owner on the latter's property (a relation which might arguably depend largely on how 
the servitude came into being and whether the [pg215] ongoing relationship was humane), a 
different situation arises when the slave has escaped. At that point, does the slave have an 
obligation to go back? To assert both that the slave has an obligation to return, and that the 
slave has no moral rights vis-a-vis the owner since he is merely the owner's chattel, is to assert 
an inconsistency. We cannot posit that the slave has moral duties if we also say that he is not a 
moral being. Hence I would conclude that it is incoherent to assert that the slave has an 
obligation to return, for at this point of escape the slave is no longer a "slave"—in Kantian 
terms, he is not a means but an end. It follows, I would argue, that others have no obligation to 
restore the fugitive to slave-status. Indeed, their obligation is the opposite: they should help the 
fugitive in his efforts to evade the owner's attempts to get him back.  
 
 But if this reasoning is accepted, the key question arises: what sort of "obligation" is it? 
A positivist would say that it is only a moral obligation; the "legal obligation" is the opposite. 
One might very well imagine H.L.A. Hart saying that a magistrate's moral obligation not to 
return the slave fugitive supersedes his legal obligation to send the slave back, with the 
conclusion that the magistrate should resign from office rather than doing an immoral act.FN46 
Professor Cover refers repeatedly to the resignation alternative and also ventures into 
psychological speculation concerning the moral dilemmas and cognitive dissonance 
experienced by judges who faced these conflicting moral and legal obligations.FN47 His 
position is clearly that of a positivist who views law and morality as separate,FN48 despite his 
discomfiture with "positivism."FN49 But all this, as Professor Fuller might have said, points to 
the deep trouble with positivism as a legal theory. For the natural law position, in contrast, 
would say that there is no such things as "legal obligation" apart from moral obligation. 
Statutory law and constitutional law do not give rise to an "obligation" unless their dictates are 
congruent with moral imperatives, and then only because of the congruence. I do not have an 
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"obligation" to obey an immoral law; at best it might only be prudent for me to do so (i.e., the 
gunman or the state—as gunman writ large—might shoot me if I didn't).FN50 Hence we must 
interpret statutory and constitutional law [pg216] in light of their necessary connection, as 
"law," with natural law. Part of the necessity of that connection, as I tried to show in a previous 
article, comes through the person of the judge as a moral agent and a necessary participant in 
the legal process.FN51 Another part comes in the strict construction of the statute or 
Constitution to avoid an moral result. Notably there were many ingenious attempts at doing 
precisely this in the nineteenth century, but Professor Cover, trapped by his own perspective, 
dismisses these as the illusions of libertarians.FN52 Quite the contrary, the exegesis of statutes 
and the Constitution to avoid sending the slave back was, I believe, the essence of the natural 
law approach.FN53 One only had to take a class with Professor Fuller to see how peerless he 
was in engaging in such methodology. The law, to him, was a lot more complex than it might 
appear on the surface, and when moral issues were at stake, a patient examination and 
unfolding of the complexity was not only necessary, but also afforded a peculiarly thrilling 
intellectual challenge to the attorney seeking a just result.  
 
 The relation between a judge's own morality and that of his society has been acutely 
presented by reactions to Judge Devlin’s book, The Enforcement of Morals.FN54 The book 
reveals a judicial attitude not unlike Fuller's description of the judge on a desert island. Devlin 
argues that despite signs of change in England, the common man (at the time of his writing, 
1959) still regards homosexuality as a punishable crime. Thus, Devlin concludes, a judge such 
as himself ought to enforce the statutory laws against homosexuals even though he, as judge, 
may not personally share the abhorrence of the "man on the Clapham omnibus" for 
homosexuality.FN55 I find this to be a most [pg217] remarkable statement about the role of a 
judge, particularly Devlin's feelings that a judge ought to decide cases in conformity with 
general popular attitudes. Would he throw the book at two homosexuals who acted in the 
privacy of their own home, even if he himself believed that what they were doing was not 
particularly bad or harmful? What compulsion exists in Devlin's mind for him to decide the 
case that way? Does he view himself as a mere instrument of majority feelings? If so, then on 
the desert island he would presumably not hesitate to order the execution of the two 
homosexuals. But what I cannot understand is, what is the nature of the "morality" that seems to 
urge Judge Devlin to conform his judgments to community preferences, particularly when he 
admits that the community on this matter is unenlightened? A year later if a poll indicates that 
51 % of the· British public believes that homosexuality should be decriminalized, would Judge 
Devlin suddenly begin throwing homosexuality cases out of court? According to his book, the 
answer would eventually be in the affirmative.FN56 Note the way Fuller himself handles the 
homosexuality question, after citing Devlin in a footnote. Fuller says he personally would 
decriminalize homosexual behavior among consenting adults because "any such law simply 
cannot be enforced and its existence on the books would constitute an open invitation to 
blackmail, so that there would be a gaping discrepancy between the law as written and its 
enforcement in practice."FN57 But this hardly solves the problem of what a judge should 
decide. Is Fuller simply saying why he would decriminalize homosexuality if he were a 
legislator? Or is he saying what a judge—like the judge in my hypothetical based on Fuller's 
desert island—ought to decide? If he is talking about what a judge should decide, then it would 
appear to be open to the judge to say, "I don't accept Fuller's conclusion because it is not 
consistent with his own premises, which include as an internal morality of law the requirement 
10 
 
of congruence between official action and declared rule. By enforcing the statute against 
homosexuality to its letter, I will be acting in accordance with Fuller's admonition. My job is to 
narrow the gap between the letter of the law and its enforcement, as Fuller says in the main part 
of his book, and not to widen that gap, as Fuller says in his personal comment later in the same 
book about what he [pg218] would do about homosexuality. Therefore I will regard his 
personal comment as an inconsistent departure from his own thesis." 
 
 I hope I have succeeded in suggesting some of the important ways in which Fuller can 
be criticized from the right. Because Fuller explicitly uses and repeats the terms "morality" and 
"Natural law," he invites this kind of criticism. I do not criticize Fuller for not moving his own 
philosophy farther to the right, but I think there is a kind of relativism that permeates his work 
that causes it to sit uneasily just to the right of center on the spectrum that I have drawn up. To 
my mind, Fuller was at his best when criticizing and attacking positivism and legal realism; he 
suggested that there were vast new ways of looking at legal questions. But when he spelled out 
his own viewpoint, I am less satisfied with the vision that he has left us. He seems to want a 
philosophy that is based on morality but he also wants one that is neutral. His "procedural 
morality" is, I think, very enlightening as far as it goes, but it seems incomplete for the reasons I 
have tried to in here. And its incompleteness, I am forced to conclude, is not simply that Fuller 
did not extend his own views far enough, but rather, in his attempt to ground his philosophy in 
morality and natural law, that he went too far in trying to label a relativistic and utilitarian 
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